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Abstract 
The ‘Quality of Democracy’ is a meta-level research programme, the rise of which 
is tied to the events of 1989 in a structural and ideational sense. Democracy, as a 
concept, has spread widely and external threats have become almost non-
existent. Thus, research of democracy has turned inward in attempting to appraise 
its quality. Upon examination, however, it is clear that the research programme 
falls short of its promise. It is insufficiently comparative both conceptually and 
historically. Proponents seem captivated by the ‘end of history’ narrative in their 
adherence to a single standard ‘liberal’ democratic quality by which all regimes are 
assessed and ranked. Symptomatically, observers both East and West imagine 
Eastern European democracies as backsliding, claiming that new democracies 
must be externally assisted. Singular notions of good democracy lead to poor 
research. 
Consequently, it is suggested that the ‘Quality of Democracy’ research programme 
must become more reflexive. Methodologically, this implies a reckoning with the 
different types of democratic substance and procedure that exist as ideas and 
institutions. With regard to 1989, it is argued that the key to understanding the 
transition to democracy and the failures of democratization in Eastern Europe lies 
in, firstly, reckoning with the Soviet legacy; and, secondly, establishing whether a 
negotiated revolution occurred or not. In conclusion, the foundations for an 
analysis of the institutional types of Eastern European procedure and substance 
are offered. Thus, a historical and comparative analysis of the quality of 
democracy in Europe is outlined. 
Keywords 
Quality of Democracy, comparative politics, Eastern Europe, Soviet illegitimacy, 
negotiated revolution, constitutional reform 
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Introduction: The Quality of Democracy as a research programme 
 
The Quality of Democracy as a comparative appraisal of democratic procedures, 
rights and outcomes has become a significant concern. It attracts an increasing 
number of social and political scientists and draws on international research 
funding and has become crucial to global governance and finance - in institutions 
as diverse as the Council of Europe and the World Bank. It has also become a 
matter of political importance in the transition to being a ‘quality democracy’ and in 
improving a country’s ranking in various ways. 
 
The future of democracy in Europe, published by the Council of Europe (2004), 
exemplifies the rising concern with the quality of democracy. Conceptualised and 
written while the Council of Europe was expanding eastwards, it was co-authored 
by academics, politicians and representatives of international organisations.1 
Concern was prompted by an observable shift of political decision-making to 
supranational bodies (also known as European integration and globalisation) and 
a significant drop in the political participation of citizens. 
 
The end of the Cold War significantly enhanced and accelerated international 
integration, but the rise of pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe and 
around the world has not led to a resurgence of political participation. Quite to the 
contrary, political participation in Europe continues to decline overall and is 
significantly lower in Eastern than in Western Europe. Moreover, there is a 
widespread impression that only (prospective) membership of the European Union 
stabilises democracy. Indeed, notions of the efficacy of external assistance, 
conditionality and even intervention have become widespread.  
 
The year 1989 is pivotal in a structural and ideational sense. As dictatorships and 
autocratic rule were swept aside, democracy spread and was consolidated. 
External threats to democracy have all but disappeared. Consequently, democratic 
theory has become self-reflexive. The Quality of Democracy is the research 
programme that combines reflexivity and history in its focus on a comparative 
appraisal of established and new democracies (Sen 1999; 
O’Donnell/Cullell/Iazzetta 2004; Diamond/Morlino 2005). The comparative and 
integrative nature potentially gives this research programme more explanatory 
power than its rivals. The theorisation of procedural variants, such as participatory 
and deliberative democracy, is equally reflexive, but any variant can be the subject 
of a comparative appraisal. Description of (national) varieties of democracy is also 
reflexive, but is equally subjected to a comparative assessment. Principally 
speaking, The Quality of Democracy is a meta-level research programme under 
which the examination of national varieties and procedural variants can be 
subsumed.  
 
Moreover, The Quality of Democracy coincides with the shift in the academy to 
frontier research, which is premised by the rise of context-driven and problem-
focused research. The Quality of Democracy blurs the boundary between science 
and society. It is to be expected that The future of democracy in Europe was co-
                                                 
1 The project was co-ordinated by Alexander Trechsel (then of the University of Geneva, now European 
University Institute) and Philippe Schmitter (European University Institute). Alexander Trechsel is the 
founder of the European Union Democracy Observatory (www.eudo.eu).  
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authored by researchers and practitioners and that the indicators deployed in 
measuring the quality of democracy were provided by international organisations 
(e.g. United Nations, World Bank) as well as by non-governmental organisations 
(e.g. Freedom House). Equally, it is obvious that researchers and practitioners 
would intervene in conceptualising and executing national audits (e.g. Costa Rica, 
United Kingdom) and in building observatories (e.g. European Union Democracy 
Observatory).2 The Quality of Democracy has a broad appeal because it 
addresses issues of overriding contemporary concern (e.g. global integration, 
declining participation, rulers’ accountability) in a way that is both historical and 
comparative. 
 
However, The Quality of Democracy (QoD) presently falls short of its promise as a 
meta-level research programme. My dissatisfaction was triggered by the 
observation that even though the rise of the QoD programme is intimately 
connected to 1989, it seems embedded in a discourse characterised by assumed 
superiority, ingrained prejudice and cultural stratification: the ‘West is Best’ and the 
rest of the world needs to catch up, but other places cannot be trusted to do this 
unless the West ‘aids’ democratisation. In the face of structural integration by pan-
European democratisation from Lisbon to Tallinn, ideational divergence is created: 
Eastern Europe is re-imagined as a set of inferior and defective democracies. This 
is surprising since the revolutions of 1989 have given the world a model for 
peaceful and negotiated revolutions, implying that emerging democracies may be 
consolidated quickly.  
 
The aim of this paper is to further develop QoD as a research programme that: 
  Recognises variation diachronically and synchronically by modelling types 
of the procedural and substantial dimensions of democracy; 
  Is methodologically sophisticated enough to enable comparisons to become 
explanatory; 
  Is historically sensitive enough to offer embedded explanations on a case-
by-case basis that are meaningful to pro-democratic actors. 
 
The initial step is, necessarily, a reconstruction of the more orthodox research 
programme (1.). Following on from that, the critique and suggested improvement 
of the comparative methodology is employed (2.). Then a critical examination of 
contemporary quality assessments of Eastern Europe is offered (3.). In order to 
substantiate the call for historical sensitivity, the historical and regional conditions 
for democratisation in Eastern Europe are enunciated by illuminating the Soviet 
legacy (4.). This is followed by a comparative appraisal of democratisation, which 
explains consolidation through the occurrence of negotiated revolutions (5.). 
Variation among the consolidated democracies is acknowledged by classifying 
regimes according to their mix of democratic substance (e.g. socioeconomic 
rights) and outcome (e.g. relative inequality) (6.).  
 
                                                 
2 For example, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) funded the Citizens’ Audit on the Quality of Democracy in Costa Rica, on which 
O’Donnell/Cullell/Iazzetta (2004) is based. See also Democratic Audit, an NGO attached to the Human 
Rights Centre, University of Essex (www.democraticaudit.com), which features an extensive assessment 
framework and coverage of the state of British democracy.  Freedom House at www.freedomhouse.org; and 
the European Union Democracy Observatory at www.eudo.eu.  
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My line of reasoning demonstrates that the QoD research programme would do 
well to delineate different types of substance and procedure, to seek explanatory 
comparisons and to be historically sensitive. The following argument also 
advances a particular hypothesis on Eastern European democratisation. As the 
Soviet relations of domination characterising the old order were beset by 
illegitimacy, leading to lawlessness, corruption and the emergence of a parallel 
society, democratisation was negatively constrained. The particular 
accomplishment of 1989, and the revolutionaries, was to have found a modus 
whereby democratic legitimacy was secured first and foremost internally by means 
of a negotiated revolution. The hypothesis that I advance is that the consolidation 
of democracy was prefigured neither by an external wave of democratisation nor 
by the return to Europe, however applicable these metaphors may seem, but, by 
whether an indigenous, negotiated revolution occurred or not. 
 
1. Quality of Democracy as procedure, substance and outcome  
 
For the notion of ‘quality of democracy’ to be meaningful, one needs to define the 
features that make a regime democratic or otherwise, e.g. authoritarian. Then, one 
needs to identify a threshold that warrants the appellation of democratic. Typically 
proponents of the QoD research programme will worry about what democracy is 
and is not and will offer a list of minimal requirements such as “1) universal adult 
suffrage; 2) recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections; 3) more than one 
serious political party; and 4) alternative sources of information” (Diamond/Morlino 
2005:XI). Democracies, which do not meet certain minimal requirements, be it by 
the characteristics cited or by others, are labelled as being defective. The QoD 
programme requires a judgement as to whether the regime under consideration 
merits further comparative examination or not. The quality of democracy is initially 
a binary judgement: yes or no. Past this threshold, a form of differentiated 
judgement is required in order to determine where any regime is located on a 
sliding scale from low to high quality. 
 
Next, the dimensions of quality must be elucidated and this requires empirical 
reasoning as to what the ‘true’ dimensions of quality are. A variety of proposals 
have been made. The most comprehensive has been floated by a group of well-
known comparativists (e.g. Larry Diamond, Leonardo Morlino, Guillermo 
O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, David Beetham, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and G. 
Bingham Powell, Jr.; in: Diamond/Morlino 2005), distinguishing a procedural from 
a substantive dimension. Some variance may be recorded as to whether 
satisfaction with the outcome is considered the most important quality. Perhaps 
the law is the all-important procedural base, but all are generally concerned with 
developing indicators that lend themselves to comparison across regimes. 
Proponents speak not just of linkage but also of trade-off and tension, but 
nevertheless they assume that they may comprehensively rank the world’s 
democracies. 
 
Table 1 – Dimensions of democratic quality 
 
Procedural Substantive Results 
The Rule of Law 
Participation 
Freedom 
Equality 
Responsiveness 
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Competition 
Vertical Accountability 
Horizontal Accountability 
Source: Diamond/Morlino 2005 
 
For the procedural dimension, typical indicators would be, for example, the rule of 
law: corruption, independence of the judiciary, access to courts, enforcement of 
court rulings; participation: the degree of civic self-organisation and electoral 
participation; competition: free and fair elections and diverse political 
organisations; vertical accountability: freedom of information and independent 
media; and of horizontal accountability: the degree of independence of parliament, 
constitutional court or central bank. Indicators give a measure of procedural 
quality, both positively and negatively. For example, one could build indicators that 
measure judiciary independence or corruption. Moreover, one may contrast the 
generic properties of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ procedures. For example, it has been 
suggested that indicators of successful accountability may be juxtaposed with 
those of failure. At the level of the citizens, this would be exemplified by 
participation in and attention to political decision-making, followed by an obligation 
to abide by decisions or alternatively, by traits of absention, indifference and 
resentment (Schmitter 2005:25-6). 
 
Freedom is seen as consisting of political, as well as civic and socio-economic, 
rights. Political equality is understood to be the bedrock of democracy. Political 
rights are seen as being essential, especially those related to elections. Civic 
rights of liberty, privacy and freedom of expression and association bolster 
democracy. Socio-economic rights may refer to property or minimum pay. Thus 
equality may be defined as a right, but it is also as a question of opportunity or 
outcome. Tensions may emerge, such as when extensive property rights impinge 
on the equality of opportunity or, further still, as entrenched disparities of wealth 
constrain the ability of individuals to participate and to compete. While much of the 
literature on the quality of democracy describes how certain dimensions positively 
or negatively reinforce each other, there is some recognition of tension. However, 
among QoD proponents, this is conventionally resolved conceptually, for example, 
by declaring that while property rights are essential, they ought to be balanced by 
socioeconomic rights such as a minimum wage.  
 
A democracy may continue, it may even be regarded as legitimate, yet this does 
not satisfy QoD proponents They want the result to signal that it is a ‘good’ 
democracy. Democracy must satisfy not just the needs of citizens but also their 
expectations. The proposition is that the empirical study of responsiveness will 
indicate the quality of the outcome. Broadly speaking, this comes from the idea 
that the more responsive rulers are to the preferences of citizens (and the more 
reliably they may be aggregated) the higher the quality of democracy. Presumably, 
a democratic regime could enter a virtuous circle as the quality of outcome allows 
for enhanced quality of procedures and substance, further improving the results. 
After all, there always seems to be room for improvement of the quality of 
democracy. 
 
2. Methodological critique:  delineating types, reckoning with history 
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One may seek to fault the QoD research programme for its ‘scientific pretensions’ 
or, alternatively, seek to uncover its internal fault line of insufficient attention to the 
difference between democracy and governance, i.e. there is no necessary link 
between a responsive democracy and positive governance (Plattner 2005). 
Moreover, the assumption that a single ranking of all democracies may be 
produced is somewhat disconcerting. But, these faults in the ideational framework 
can be fixed. What is more difficult is that proponents of the QoD programme have 
allowed themselves to be captivated by the ‘end of history’ ideology. In the 
aftermath of 1989, amidst the third wave of democratisation, it may have seemed 
to many observers that there is only one model of democracy; whether there is 
only one ‘working’ model of democracy or only one model, which survives. This is 
the problem with context-oriented frontier research: it is easy to accept the 
‘context-of-the-day’ instead of exploring historical variation and considering 
conceptual variety.  
 
That the QoD research programme has neglected variation in the substance of 
democracy is surprising. Europe, for example, has known such distinctive 
practices as Liberal, Social and Christian democracy, and Western Europe has 
been characterised by relative stable macro-regions with a distinct mix of freedom 
and equality. Analysed as Anglo-Saxon, Nordic and continental models of welfare 
(Esping-Anderson 1990), they suggest not only the prevalence of certain political 
ideas and parties in these macro-regions, but also indicate that a particular 
outcome is seen as legitimating democracy. Moreover, there is an argument that 
socio-economic data indicate that more macro-regions are emerging, for example, 
in East Asia and Latin America. Macro-regions are characterised by intra-regional 
similarities and distinct inter-regional differences (Mann 2006). 
 
On the procedural plane it is surprising that the QoD proponents have similarly 
neglected to examine variation. To be sure, the authors of The future of 
democracy in Europe list numerical, negotiative and deliberative democracy as 
procedural alternatives, but then only declare that a mix of them is a ‘good’ thing 
(Council of Europe 2004). However, once the distinction between democracy and 
dictatorship became less defining after 1989, critique and elaboration of the theory 
and practice of democracy proliferated. Notable have been the extended debates 
on deliberative and participatory democracy that have, like QoD, spawned the 
divide been science and society.3  
 
A singular notion of good democracy makes for bad research. However, it is 
possible to name the methodological requirements for elaborating the QoD 
research programme. Since many QoD proponents are comparativists interested 
in capturing and explaining variation among democratic regimes, one would 
assume that they pick up on this. It is possible to: 
  Describe the benefits to be derived from embedding the comparative 
method in the conceptualisation of QoD; and 
  Explicate how researchers might go about building (ideal) types of 
procedure and substance. 
 
                                                 
3 For example, www.deliberative-democracy.net; cdd.stanford.edu;  the case of Porte Alegre as a model of 
participatory democracy; www.nuovomunicipio.org.  
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The QoD programme is open to the charge of downplaying the partisan and 
divisive character of democracy to the extent of foisting a single, unified ideal of 
democratic quality upon the world. This makes for a logical contradiction. This 
inconsistency may be resolved by acknowledging that there are partisan notions of 
the quality of democracy. These partisan notions matter theoretically in defining 
substance and procedure of democracy, just as they matter historically as 
characteristics of democratic regimes and their outcome. To acknowledge 
partisanship does not require one to give up on the notion of a threshold for 
democracy. Yet, it requires specifying, at the very least, the major types of 
procedure and substance as well as reckoning with historical variation. In that 
framework, a much more explanatory assessment of the quality of democracy 
becomes possible. 
 
Acknowledging that historical and contemporary variation exists, or that there is a 
partisan struggle over the procedure and substance of democracy, is not to give 
up a neutral standpoint. Quite to the contrary, by examining historical and 
contemporary variety, and distilling types, it becomes possible to evaluate any 
democratic regime in relation to its ideas and institutions as well as in comparison 
to other regimes. Instead of having to invoke a fixed set of dimensions as ‘tertium 
comparationis’, defined a priori, suffused with the prejudices-of-the-day, the 
researcher can compare against historical ideal types, current ideals and 
practices, and alternative contemporary cases. To be sure, simple ‘credit’ ratings 
and national rankings would no longer be meaningful, but it is hard to see how 
scholarship would be worse off for that.  What emerges is a more complex matrix 
of cases that may be evaluated, criticised and commended from the inside 
(specific ideas and institutions) and the outside (comparative cases), fostering an 
explanatory understanding of the quality of democracy across time and space. 
 
3. Deficient democracies in Eastern Europe? 
 
It is clear that a significant number of regimes in Eastern Europe, whatever the 
rulers’ pretensions and propaganda, are not democratic (Hutcheson/Korosteleva 
2006). From the countries that eventually emerged from the Soviet imperial 
breakdown, followed by the Yugoslav wars of secession, perhaps ten regimes are 
consolidated democracies (Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia). Judging by the QoD studies 
and indicators that are available (Berg-Schlosser 2006:43), a few countries have 
democratic prospects (Croatia, Macedonia, Romania); some are borderline cases 
with some prospects of becoming democratic (Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, 
Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia); some lack state capacity (Bosnia-Herzegovina, now 
also Kosovo); or some have moved beyond the pale (Russia). A few regimes do 
not seem to have the will to become democratic anytime soon (Belarus, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan). In fact, an 
emerging alternative model to electoral democracy might be competitive 
authoritarianism, including Ukraine and Georgia (Way 2006). Based on statistics 
alone, the legacy of the Soviet period is anything but edifying.  
 
Yet, moral panic ensues not over the authoritarian regimes but instead over 
democracy: “Is East-Central Europe Backsliding?” asked the Journal of 
Democracy in 2007. While it did allow for the possibility that the notion of a (newly) 
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precarious democracy was overblown, the battery of questions presented left no 
doubt that the editors were seriously concerned. The distinguished respondents 
by-and-large concurred, with one exception, noting that democracy was solid as 
long as the system of checks and balances would continue to function (Jasiewicz 
2007:30). An alternate conclusion blames the elites: “The real clash is between 
elites that are becoming ever more suspicious of democracy and angry publics 
that are becoming ever more hostile to liberalism” (Krastev 2007:63). Principally 
the whole region was thought to be in danger, while Poland and Romania were 
singled out in particular for a whole list of deficiencies such as populist electoral 
gains, political radicalization, weak majority, factional behaviour and misbehaviour 
of political elites (Mungiu-Pippidi 2007:10).  
 
Box 1 – Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? 
 
 
The editors of the Journal of Democracy, Marc F. Plattner and Larry Diamond, wrote: 
 
“The global “third wave” of democratization has produced a remarkable number of 
transitions from authoritarian rule, but so far relatively few of these have led to 
democratic consolidation. The region that seemed to be successful in this regard was 
Central and Eastern Europe. By 1998 the former Warsaw Pact countries, despite 
confronting difficult obstacles, had progressed to the point where they all had been 
designated by Freedom House as Free countries. Whatever danger remained of their 
reverting to authoritarianism seems to be removed by their entry into the European 
Union… Yet today, all are beset by sharp political conflict, and there is growing 
concern about the solidity of their democracies.” 
 
This op-ed was followed by questions: 
 
“1. Is the perception that democracy is increasingly precarious in these countries 
well-grounded or is it overblown? 
2. In either case, what has changed to create the impression of democratic 
weakening? To what extent are the relevant factors country-specific or common to 
the region as a whole? 
3. What is the greatest source of danger to democracy: Populism? Extremism? 
Failure to break sharply enough with the communist past? Failure to deliver good 
governance (e.g. by controlling corruption)? Disappointing economic performance? 
Other factors? 
4. What has been the effect of entry into the EU? Is the EU part of the problem? 
Part of the solution? Or both? To what extent is the EU still a source of scrutiny and 
pressure for improved governance, now that these countries have become 
members? 
5. To what extent is the current political malaise specifically tied to the region and 
its communist past? And to what extent is it a manifestation of Europe-wide problems 
or of even broader, global problems facing new (and not so new) democracies?” 
 
Source: Journal of Democracy 18:4:5-6 
 
The moral panic over East-Central Europe demonstrates what is wrong with the 
current version of the QoD programme: 
  An implicitly partisan notion of quality that results from having only a single 
standard; 
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  The idea that citizens and their attitudes are the problem, seen in the 
dismay in seeing that even EU membership cannot guarantee solidity; 
  The mistake of inferring the quality of democracy from contemporary 
election results; 
  The lack of a historical analysis as to the character of the democratic 
regime, which allows analysts to be misled by surface phenomena.  
 
Citations from the Journal of Democracy serve to demonstrate this. The authors’ 
place of birth, country of residence and position in 1989 seem not to have 
significantly influenced current perceptions. The authors of the quotes are not 
identified to make the point that a discourse exists that is quite independent of the 
speakers. Anyone reading this journal will notice that the authors cite other 
scholars, observers and revolutionary heroes who share the sense of democracy 
as being precarious.  
 
Box 2 – Moral panic over the quality of ‘teenage’ democracies 
 
 
“The incentive of EU accession led countries to the remarkable scores that they 
achieved in the early 1990s…The EU’s coaching and assistance …did not deliver 
much. …As for the day after accession, when conditionality has faded, the influence 
of the EU vanishes.” (pp. 15-16) 
 
“The CEE setbacks underline the importance for democratic consolidation of a civic 
culture… without which the legitimacy and stability of democratic institutions will 
always remain doubtful.” (p. 19) 
 
“EU tutelage works until you get in, but once you have joined there are few incentives 
or means to induce further reforms or the observance of democratic norms.” (p. 22) 
 
“The weakness of the region’s political parties is primarily determined by the general 
crisis of values and authority. There is an absence of “social glue,” and the existing 
formations have failed to foster the consensus needed in order to generate 
constitutional patriotism.” (p. 38) 
 
“Politics has been unstable across Central and Eastern Europe… since the accession 
of ten of the region’s countries to the European Union. …there have been riots and 
mass demonstrations, centrist parties have become radicalized, and illiberal extremist 
forces have come to power. The rise of radical voices has coincided with a mass exit 
of citizens from formal politics, as evidenced by… dramatic drops in voter turnout. 
Opinion polls reveal strong dissatisfaction with democracy and a lack of trust in 
institutions. Although such symptoms have been observed in older EU member 
states, these symptoms’ strength and their occurrence in the new member states 
signal deeper troubles for the democracies of the CEE region.” (p. 40) 
 
“The common theme behind the region’s recent political turbulence is elite and 
middle-class frustrations with either economic or the political aspects of the 
“unfinished transformation”, and… cut-throat rivalries between competing factions… 
mobilized by leaders who call for zero-sum solutions.” (p. 43) 
 
“Provincialism is widespread, banalization is the rule, and the promotion of a political 
public sphere… is an exception.” (p. 51) 
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“… with the accession process complete, strict conditionality no longer applies and 
has given way to traditional domestic political culture… the EU is no longer viewed as 
an entity that must be obeyed, but increasingly as one that may be disputed in 
court… the Union is less capable of scrutinizing and enforcing the quality of 
governance within individual states.” (p. 52) 
 
“The liberal era that began in Central Europe in 1989 has come to an end. Populism 
and illiberalism are tearing the region apart. … The political class is viewed as corrupt 
and self-interested. Dissatisfaction with democracy is growing. … Central Europe… is 
the region of the world where citizens are most sceptical about the merits of 
democracy. The picture is bleak and depressing.” (pp. 56-7) 
 
Source: Journal of Democracy 18:4 
 
Overall, the proponents of the QoD programme have missed the opportunity to 
investigate differences in democratic quality and to explore the possibility of 
different models. Some of the texts on the quality of democracy in Eastern Europe 
display an intimate knowledge with history from 1989 onwards. Some also indicate 
that an Eastern European model of democracy might emerge and that this would 
have been conditioned historically by the events of 1989 and subsequent 
developments, particularly in politics and economics. Unfortunately, the prospect 
of enriching our understanding of democracy, by focusing on how Eastern 
democracy is different and impinges on Western democracy, has been missed. In 
the context of the wider European history, this ignorance is truly remarkable, as 
Europe has been the birthplace of differing conceptions of democracy and a site of 
struggle over theories and practice. 
 
4. Legacy: Soviet illegitimacy and democracy 
 
At the time of their occurrence, the democratic revolutions of 1989 seemed a fait 
accompli, the transition swift and consolidation secure. This seemingly made any 
further investigation of the historical and regional conditions unnecessary. 
Moreover, the comparative focus on democratic transitions discouraged historical 
reasoning in favour of a search for similarities and differences with earlier waves of 
democratization in Southern Europe and Latin America. This is remarkable insofar 
as during the 20th century Soviet dictatorship was treated as being quite distinct 
and a lot of intellectual effort went into specifying the case. However, as 
Sovietologists did not even anticipate the possibility of Soviet breakdown, this may 
have made it easy to ignore the literature and the specifics of Soviet history.  
 
Yet, the moral panics over ‘teenage’ democracy in Eastern Europe, as well as the 
vain attempts to induce or shore up democracy through external intervention, 
demonstrate a lack of appreciation of history.4 The aim is not to advance an 
argument about how Eastern Europe got derailed in the process of modernization 
nor is it to represent totalitarianism as a catchall explanation. Rather, it is to make 
a historical argument about the conditions and constraints of Eastern European 
                                                 
4 I treat the inner and the outer Soviet empire as a unified space for which the events of the year 1989 were 
decisive – viz. the human chain in the Baltic in August 1989 or the voiding of the Hitler-Stalin pact in 
December 1989 by the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies. Admittedly, Slovenia is a different case, related to the 
break-up of Yugoslavia. There is however, some evidence of interlinkage across Central Europe (Kenney 
2002) and possibly a case could be made that Slovenia experienced a negotiated revolution too. 
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democratization. The argument is that the legacy of the Soviet empire negatively 
constrained democratisation, because the Soviet relations of domination 
characterising the old order were beset by persistent illegitimacy; leading to 
lawlessness, re-traditionalisation and the emergence of a parallel society.  
 
Soviet history was very much a history of terror  - against outsiders and insiders, 
including communist party members. Terror was brought under control after 
Stalin’s death, but it had been of unprecedented scope in engulfing the whole 
Soviet empire and many communist parties, it had lasted for 20 years and had 
been extraordinarily intense in the Soviet hierarchy. In bringing terror under 
control, the key issue for political organisation was whether rationalisation or 
traditionalisation would prevail (Moore 1954). Attempts at rationalisation were 
made in Moscow and the provinces, including the efforts that became known as 
the Prague Spring. Yet, rationalisation was never achieved in Soviet networks - 
not even locally, in the most advanced East German economy (Pirker 1995).  
 
The indicators of failed rationalisation are: the regular, voluntarist violation of 
formal rules or legal regulations; the personalisation of administrative practices 
and the extension of office prerogatives over family and friends; and the 
prevalence of political and personal loyalty in recruitment over meritocratic criteria 
(Pakulski 1986). Further indicators of failed rationalisation are: no party in the 
Soviet empire was able to re-establish democratic centralism; all parties tightly 
controlled their polity to pre-empt organised challenges; all other organisations in 
the networks were heteronomous and heterocephalous, and still subjected to 
surveillance by the organs of coercion; the whole population was locked into these 
organisations, and immobilised by a combination of military occupation and police 
pressure, with direct and illegal coercion for individual dissenters; and the borders 
stayed sealed. With any breach of its strict control, the imperial association felt 
threatened, and retaliated extra-legally (Armbruster 2005). 
 
Moreover, re-traditionalisation offered the possibility of securing a niche in a kind 
of ‘parallel’ or ‘second’ society (Hankiss 1989, Hosking 2000). These legitimate 
ties helped in privatising whatever resources could be diverted, further promoting 
traditionalisation and undercutting rationalisation. Notably, the nomenklatura kept 
its parallel networks from coalescing into formal organisation so as to evade the 
organs of coercion (Rigby 1988, Ahlberg 1991). In the USSR of the 1970s and 
1980s there were about 400,000 persons eligible for appointment in the core 
organisations: these included people in the party organs, state administration and 
military. A further 450,000 cadres were on lists which covered mainly the 
economic and cultural networks. With their families, this group comprised one per 
cent of the population, characterised by informal patron-client relationships. Not 
just in the USSR, but also throughout Eastern Europe, the nomenklatura became 
the patrons of the parallel society, which deepened economic shortage by 
diverting resources from one place to alleviate shortage somewhere else in return 
for a private profit. 
 
Re-traditionalisation and the parallel society cannot be understood as being 
conducive to democratisation, since this presumes the rule of law, the 
rationalisation of politics and accountability in the process – all of which were not 
only ‘deficient’ in the Soviet realm but were being undercut. This historical 
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condition was not only a legacy, which was examined in the 1990s as a 
civilisational gap (Engler 1992, Sztompka 1993), but it also became part of the 
revolutionary equation in 1989. The pro-democratic revolutionaries had to make a 
decision on how to relate to the incumbent rulers and their nomenklatura. In 
pursuing the option of a negotiated revolution they co-opted the nomenklatura into 
the new democratic order. 
 
5. Origins: negotiated revolution or not? 
 
The self-styled handmaiden of events, Timothy Garton-Ash, quipped that 1989 
was a ‘refolution’, implying that the events did not quite amount to a revolution but 
were somewhat more than a reform. Some spoke of an ‘un-revolution’, implying an 
un-doing of Leninism, but not yet a revolution in its own right. Some were willing to 
grant the epitaph revolution but then qualified it, as in ‘rectifying’ revolution, 
suggesting that a region ‘derailed’ was returning to a ‘normal’ path. However, to 
get back on track, the actors had to accomplish a triple transition – political, 
economic and cultural. Moreover, many observers thought it would take decades 
to achieve the ‘rectification’ by a triple transition (politics, economics, culture – in, 
respectively, six months, six years and six decades). The acknowledged triple 
transition belies the notion of a ‘refolution’: 1989 was a revolution. Not only that, 
throughout most of Eastern Europe change has been implemented apace, 
counterrevolutions were rarely attempted and the process has stayed on track. 
How do we explain this? And what are the implications for the quality of 
democracy? 
 
George Lawson (2005) has argued that the notion of ‘negotiated revolution’ 
captures events in and around 1989 in Czechoslovakia, Chile and South Africa. 
Theorists of modern revolution have hitherto assumed that revolutions are 
necessarily violent and will include, in later stages, some form of reversal. 
However, per Lawson, negotiated revolutions shift away from earlier patterns in 
some distinctive ways. The revolutionaries espouse an ideology of liberation rather 
than dreaming of utopia, accepting mutual dependency domestically and 
internationally. Civil conflict and war are viewed as being undesirable. The result is 
that the ‘fight to the finish’ is replaced by a negotiated revolution. Like in any 
revolution, the old order collapses and a new one is built, but all actors are taken 
along. The price that revolutionaries pay, per Lawson, is the emergence of a 
relatively weak state in terms of authority and capacity, while national and 
international actors remain strong and independent. 
 
The revolutions of 1989 occurred in a permissive environment, characterised by 
the end of the Cold War and the welcoming of the revolutionaries. Soviet imperial 
breakdown reinforced permissiveness as the threat of intervention was removed. 
Yet, the revolution is the accomplishment of the pro-democracy movements 
insofar as civil strife is avoided. Indeed, Lawson was not the first to speak of 
negotiated revolutions, Rudolf Tökes (1996) had done so earlier for Hungary and 
Allister Sparks (1996) for South Africa. The original theorist of the negotiated 
revolution is Jadwiga Staniszkis, the Polish sociologist and the advisor to Solidarity 
who became known for her book Poland’s self-limiting revolution (1984). Her 
analysis of the rise of Solidarity shows the theory and practice of negotiated 
revolutions in the making. This strategy was not successful in 1981 and Staniszkis 
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dissects the drawbacks. Yet, in many ways 1981 was the trial-run for successful 
negotiated revolutions which occurred just a few years later. In spreading the 
lessons of the trial-run lies the significance of the social movements in Central 
Europe in the late 1980s (Kenney 2002). 
 
The notion of negotiated revolution conjures up the image of the ‘Round Tables’ of 
1989 and 1990. While it has to be acknowledged that only in Poland (February to 
April 1989) and Hungary (June to September 1989) were they decisive in fostering 
revolution; they did support the revolution in many more states, leading to power 
sharing and free elections in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the German 
Democratic Republic (Bozoki 2002). Moreover, while the ‘Round Table’ is a 
symbol of negotiated revolutions, it is not the only means by which to achieve this 
outcome, which was also in evidence in the Baltic States. In the Baltic, the Popular 
Fronts were founded by members of the Communist nomenklatura. One must not 
confuse the later confrontation between Baltic nationalists and Russian minorities 
with the revolution of 1989 that led to the declarations of independence in 1990. In 
the Baltic republics, the Communist nomenklatura of the titular nation was co-
opted into the new order (Lieven 1994: 230-44). Characteristic of 1989 was that 
the protagonists of a de-legitimised regime were unable to continue but the 
revolutionary forces were also unable to secure a victory. The solution brokered in 
this situation of mutual dependence kept violence at bay (there was structural 
violence and a latent possibility of a crackdown, but the manifestations of armed 
power were indecisive), enabling the negotiated transition to political democracy 
on the basis of ideas of human rights, justice and equality. 
 
On a case-by-case basis, for the states that emerged from the Soviet imperial 
breakdown, there is evidence of a correlation of negotiated revolutions with 
democratic consolidation (cf. Linz/Stepan 1996). Romania and Croatia are two 
states that did not experience negotiated revolutions but nevertheless have 
achieved some form of democratic consolidation twenty years on. However, these 
are not critical cases that disprove the hypothesis that democratic consolidation in 
Eastern Europe was dependent on internal factors and that decisive among these 
was the occurrence of a negotiated revolution. External opportunities and regional 
constraints may induce an otherwise authoritarian elite to give way. Romania and 
Croatia (and the rest of the former Yugoslavia and Albania) have a clear incentive: 
reform or be left behind and cut off from the realm of prosperity. It may indeed be 
the case that these ‘late’ democracies need external constraints and inducements 
to stabilise (as could be said of the earlier examples of West Germany and Italy 
after World War II), but this does not negate the strong hypothesis that negotiated 
revolutions established democratic legitimacy, securing consolidation. 
 
6. Constitutions, welfare and the quality of democracy in Eastern Europe 
 
Socioeconomic rights were a highly symbolic issue after 1989, with regard to the 
legacy of the failed economies of state socialism and the ongoing privatization and 
marketization of the economy. Drafters of constitutions in Eastern Europe included 
broad rights modelled on Western European welfare states (e.g. the Catholic or 
continental model) in stark contrast to the Anglo-Saxon model (Sadurski 2002). 
There is also a notable difference to the Nordic countries, which do not 
constitutionally provide for extensive welfare. However, a look at the GINI 
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coefficient shows that, twenty years after the revolutions of 1989, several countries 
cluster with the Nordic countries, i.e. Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 
Other countries cluster with Germany, France and the Netherlands, such as 
Hungary, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. Poland and the Baltic countries cluster 
with the UK, Australia and New Zealand (UNDP 2007). 
 
The variation in socioeconomic rights and relative inequality points to a divergence 
in democratic substance and outcome. Arguably, Western democracies were 
reconfigured in the aftermath of the capitalist collapse of 1929 and the onslaught 
of fascism and communism. The welfare state became essential to democracy 
because it defined the balance struck between freedom and equality. It should 
provide food for thought that, at first glance, the consolidated democracies of 
Eastern Europe cluster with known types of democratic welfare regimes (e.g. 
Nordic, Continental and Anglo-Saxon).  
 
The constitutions of Communist Europe were restricted by party rule. Only 
Yugoslavia (1963) and Poland (1985) had established constitutional courts and 
these likewise were subject to Communist party rule. After the transition from 
communism all countries have constitutional courts. In the transition to democracy 
the constitutional courts have played an activist role. While some have lauded the 
constitutional courts as promoters and defenders of democracy (e.g. Schwartz 
2000) others have been more sceptical about the striking down of policies voted 
for by parliamentary majorities (e.g. Sadurski 2001). However, if we place the rise 
of new, activist courts in the context of the Soviet legacy, then constitutional courts 
needed to establish their legitimacy first so as to legitimate the rule of law. The first 
is a matter of horizontal and vertical accountability (e.g. parliament, citizens), 
whereas the second is about establishing the rule of law as procedural base. 
 
Constitutions and constitutional court (CC) rulings affect all dimensions of 
democratic substance and procedure, while the court itself is an element of the 
quality of democracy in terms of accountability and the enforcement of the rule of 
law. In this sense, constitutional courts and their rulings are like a prism through 
which the quality of democracy may be illuminated in its facets. Negotiated 
revolutions have been followed in Eastern Europe, without exception, by the 
adoption of an electoral system of proportional representation. This co-opted the 
former communist party, its nomenklatura and members into the new democracy. 
Moreover, the CCs bolstered proportional representation by limiting or striking 
down any legislation aimed at introducing direct democracy. At the same time, the 
CCs extended passive electoral rights where they had been curtailed to include 
military personnel and civil servants (Sadurski 2003). Constitutions established a 
procedural notion of quality insisting on representation. This notion was bolstered 
by liberal (i.e. unrestricted) rights to association and assembly, enabling 
participation, and rulings that restricted tightly legislative and executive 
interference with the freedom of media while bolstering both the freedom of 
expression and of information, introducing strong horizontal and vertical 
accountability. Proportional representation, as preferred procedure, structures not 
only democratic competition and participation, but also reinforces horizontal 
accountability, for example, by requiring public broadcasters to make room for the 
representation of the conflicting views of civic associations.  
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For Eastern Europe, the gap between the constitutional pledge and the actual 
means to provide welfare is currently larger there than for any regime in the West. 
This cautions us against any reading of the data suggesting that Western macro-
regions have direct equivalents in Eastern Europe. Moreover, socioeconomic 
rights are under-enforceable. However, the Western European macro-regions 
consolidated at much lower levels of national wealth (i.e. the beginning of the 20th 
century, and after World War II), which implies that Eastern European regions may 
also be consolidating now. Moreover, there is some consistency through 
constitutions, constitutional court rulings and path-dependent development. The 
Baltic states have the constitutions with only the basic socio-economic rights listed 
(e.g. social security, health care, education); while the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia have constitutions with comprehensive rights. There is one exception: 
Poland features comprehensive constitutional rights but higher inequality. 
 
Negotiated revolutions in Eastern Europe have not been followed by the uniform 
adoption of a particular substantial dimension but by various models of combining 
freedom with equality that have a definite outcome. The GINI coefficient is 
admittedly only one way of looking at that outcome, albeit an important one. What 
this demonstrates is that a comparative and historical investigation of the quality of 
democracy is meaningful, but that an assessment and ranking of countries 
according to a single notion is meaningless. If this is accepted, then there is ample 
scope for further theoretical and empirical research on the quality of democracy in 
Europe, in the East and in the West as well as between both of these locations. 
 
 17
Literature cited: 
 
Ahlberg, R.  (1991) Das sowjetische Privilegiensystem. Entstehung und Auflösung. 
Osteuropa 41:1135-1157 
 
Armbruster, Chris (2005) Soviet relations of domination: legitimate or illegitimate? 
Working Paper. Available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=790508  
 
Berg-Schlosser, D. (2006) The Quality of Democracies in Europe as Measured by Current 
Indicators of Democratization and Good Governance. In Hutcheson/Korosteleva, op.cit. 
 
Bozoki, A., ed. (2002) The Roundtable talks of 1989: the genesis of Hungarian democracy. 
Budapest CEU Press 
 
Butora, M. (2007) Nightmares from the Past, Dreams of the Future. Journal of Democracy 
18:4:47-55 
 
Council of Europe (2004) The future of democracy in Europe: trends, analyses and reforms 
/ co-ordinated by P.C. Schmitter, A.H. Trechsel. Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
Publishing. 
 
Diamond, L. and L. Morlino, eds. (2005) Assessing the quality of democracy. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Engler, W. (1992) Die zivilisatorische Lücke. Versuche über den Staatssozialismus. 
Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp 
 
Eisenstadt, S.N. and R. Lemarchand (1981) Political clientelism, patronage and 
development. London: Sage 
 
Esping-Anderson, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity 
Press & Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Greskovits, B. (2007) Economic Woes and Political Disaffection. Journal of Democracy 
18:4:40-46 
 
Hankiss, E. (1989) Demobilization, Self-Mobilization and Quasi-Mobilization in Hungary, 
1948-1987. East European Politics and Societies 3:1:105-149. 
 
Hosking, G. (2000) Patronage and the Russian State. Slavonic and East European Review 
78:2:301-320. 
 
Hutcheson, D.S. and E.A. Korosteleva eds. (2006) The Quality of Democracy in Post-
Communist Europe. London: Routledge 
 
Jasiewicz, K. (2007) The Political-Party Landscape. Journal of Democracy 18:4:26-33 
 
Lawson, G. (2005) Negotiated Revolutions: The Czech Republic, South Africa and Chile. 
Ashgate Publishing. 
 
 18
Lieven, A. (1993) The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the path to 
independence. Second edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Linz, J.J. and A. Stepan (1996) Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Balltimore: JHU Press. 
 
Kenney, P. (2002) A carnival of revolution: Central Europe 1989. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Krastev, I. (2007) The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus. Journal of Democracy 
18:4:56-63 
 
Mann, M. (2006) Globalization, Macro-Regions and Nation-States. In: G. Bude, S. Conrad 
and O. Janz, eds. Transnationale Geschichte. Themen. Theorien. Tendenzen. Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht 
 
Moore, B. (1954) Terror and Progress USSR. Some sources of change and stability in the 
Soviet dictatorship.  Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 
 
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2007) EU Accession is no ‘End of History’. Journal of Democracy 
18:4:8-16 
 
O'Donnell, G.; J.V. Cullell, and O.M. Iazzetta, eds. (2004) The quality of democracy: 
theory and applications. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Pakulski, J. (1986) Legitimacy and Mass Compliance: Reflections on Max Weber and 
Soviet-Type Societies. British Journal of Political Science 16:1:35-56 
 
Pirker, T. et al. (1995) Der Plan als Befehl und Fiktion. Wirtschaftsführung in der DDR. 
Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 
 
Plattner, M.F. (2005) A Skeptical Perspective. In: Diamond/Morline, op.cit 
 
Plattner, M.F. and L. Diamond (2007) Introduction: Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? 
Journal of Democracy 18:4:4-6 
 
Rigby, T.H. (1988) ‘Staffing USSR Incorporated: The Origins of the Nomenklatura 
System’, Soviet Studies 40:4:523-537 
 
Rupnik, J. (2007) From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash. Journal of Democracy 
18:4:17-25 
 
Sadurski, W. (2001) Postcommunist Constitutional Courts in Search of Political 
Legitimacy. EUI Working Papers Law No. 11. 
 
- (2002) Constitutional courts in the process of articulating constitutional rights in the post-
Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. Part I: social and economic rights. EUI 
Working Papers Law No. 14. 
 
 19
- (2003) Constitutional courts in the process of articulating constitutional rights in the post-
Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. Part II: personal, civil and political rights 
and liberties. EUI Working Papers Law No. 01. 
 
Schmitter, P.C. (2005) The Ambiguous Virtues of Accountability. In: Diamond/Morlino, 
op.cit 
 
Schwartz, H. (2000) The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Sen, A. (1999) Democracy as a Universal Value. Journal of Democracy 10:3:3-17 
 
Sparks, A. (1996) Tomorrow is another country: the inside story of South Africa’s 
negotiated revolution. London: Mandarin 
 
Staniszkis, J. (1984) Poland’s self-limiting revolution. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Sztompka, P. (1993) Civilizational Incompetence: The Trap of Post-Communist Societies. 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie 22:85-95. 
 
Tismaneanu, V. (2007) Leninist Legacies, Pluralist Dilemmas. Journal of Democracy 
18:4:34-39 
 
Tökes, R.L. (1996) Hungary’s negotiated revolution: economic reform, social change and 
political succession 1957-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
UNDP (2007) Human Development Report 2007/08. London: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Way, L.A. 82006) The Sources and Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in 
Ukraine. In: Hutcheson/Korosteleva, op.cit.  
 
